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Abstract
GRW theory oers precise laws for the collapse of the wave function. These
collapses are characterized by two new constants,  and . Recent work has put
experimental upper bounds on the collapse rate, . Lower bounds on  have been
more controversial since GRW begins to take on a many-worlds character for small
values of . Here I examine GRW in this odd region of parameter space where
collapse events act as natural disasters that destroy branches of the wave function
along with their occupants. Our continued survival provides evidence that we don't
live in a universe like that. I oer a quantitative analysis of how such evidence can
be used to assess versions of GRW with small collapse rates in an eort to move
towards more principled and experimentally-informed lower bounds for .
1 Introduction
One central point of disagreement in the foundations of quantum mechanics is whether
the collapse of the wave function is a genuine physical process. If collapse is to be taken
seriously, we should seek to determine physical laws that might govern this process.
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory (GRW) oers possible precise laws which guarantee that
the wave function collapses during familiar quantum measurements. However, observers
and measurements have no special status in the theory, collapses happen all over the
place whether or not scientists are watching.
The laws of GRW include two new fundamental constants not present in textbook
discussions of quantum mechanics. One parameter, , characterizes the precision of the
collapse events and the other, , the rate at which collapses occur. If these parameters
are chosen properly, the theory appears to succeed in generating the correct probabilistic
predictions for experiments taken to be within the purview of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. However, as more experiments are conducted we continue to shrink the
space of possible values for  and . Potentially, the allowed region could shrink so
much it disappears and GRW could be ruled out. Alternatively, new experiments might
conrm GRW over its competitors. As of now, there seems to be a fair amount of
leeway as to what values we may assign to the parameters (gure 1). Focus on the
collapse rate . It is fairly well-understood how we can put experimental upper bounds
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on the collapse rate. If collapse events were too frequent, interference patterns would
be destroyed by particles collapsing mid-experiment, isolated systems would heat up,
photons would be spontaneously emitted by free particles, and in other varied ways the
experimental predictions of the theory would be corrupted (these constraints have been
reviewed recently in Adler, 2007; Feldmann & Tumulka, 2012; Bassi et al. , 2013).
Figure 1: Parameter diagram of GRW theory
from Feldmann & Tumulka (2012). ERR is
the \empirically refuted region." PUR is the
\philosophically unsatisfactory region." The points
labeled \GRW" and \Adler" indicate the values
suggested in Ghirardi et al. (1986) and Adler (2007)
respectively. It should be noted that Adler's proposal
was made in the context of CSL, not GRW.
In this article, I would like to explore how we might put experimental lower bounds
on the collapse rate . The trend in the literature has been to dismiss low values of  for
non-empirical reasons or for reasons that presuppose the failure of the many-worlds
interpretation. When  is very small GRW becomes an odd theory. Macroscopic
objects are not prevented from entering superpositions and the theory takes on a
many-worlds character (x3). Such versions of GRW have been rejected as philosophically
unsatisfactory. Surely they are. But, there has been disagreement about exactly where
the problems arise. Feldmann & Tumulka (2012) give the criterion, \We regard a
parameter choice (; ) as philosophically satisfactory if and only if the PO [primitive
ontology] agrees on the macroscopic scale with what humans normally think macroscopic
reality is like." Bassi et al. (2010) impose the requirement that \any superposition
reaching the eye must be reduced before it is transformed into a perception in the
brain.", building on a suggestion in Aicardi et al. (1991). Adler (2007) and Gisin &
Percival (1993) argue that the formation of a microscopic latent image in a detector
counts as a measurement even before this image is amplied to macroscopic scale. They
believe that the collapse rate must be high enough that even these latent images do not
enter superpositions.
I will argue that very small values of  are not just philosophically problematic, they
are empirically unacceptable even if the many-worlds interpretation is viable. In doing
so, I hope to begin shifting the burden from philosophical considerations to empirical
ones and to lay the foundation for a principled and experimentally informed approach
to determining lower bounds on . Although the paper will focus on GRW throughout,
many of the lessons could be applied to mutatis mutandis other collapse theories.
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2 GRW Theory
In GRW theory, the evolution of the wave function is typically governed by the familiar
Schrodinger equation,
i~
d
dt
j	(t)i = bH j	(t)i : (2.1)
At some instants, the evolution of the wave function is discontinuous and not in accord
with the Schrodinger equation. The wave function collapses. According GRW, collapse
is a real physical process governed by well-dened laws and occurring frequently, not
just during measurements. Humans and other observers play no spooky role, they are
just particularly intelligent and perceptive collections of particles.
When a collapse occurs, a randomly chosen particle has its position become extremely
well-localized. Collapses occur randomly at a rate of N where N is the total number
of particles. That is, once a collapse occurs at T1 the probability that the next collapse,
at T2, will happen within time interval t is given by
P (T2   T1 < t) = 1  e Nt : (2.2)
The collapse rate  is one of two new constants of the theory, originally suggested to
be on the order of 10 16s 1 (Ghirardi et al. , 1986). The collapse localizes particle I
(randomly chosen) around location X, where X is chosen randomly with probability
density
I(x) = lim
t%T
h	(t)jI(x) j	(t)i : (2.3)
\limt%T " denotes the limit as t approaches the time of collapse, T , from below. i(x)
is the collapse operator dened by
i(x) =
1
(22)
3=2
e 
(bxi x)2
22 ; (2.4)
where bxi is the position operator for particle i. The wave function after the collapse is
given by the pre-collapse wave function multiplied by a tightly peaked three-dimensional
Gaussian centered about X and normalized,
lim
t&T
j	(t)i = lim
t%T
I(X)
1=2 j	(t)i
h	(t)jI(X) j	(t)i1=2
: (2.5)
The second new constant in GRW, , appears in (2.4) and characterizes the width of
the Gaussian that localizes the particle. It was originally proposed to be on the order of
10 7m (Ghirardi et al. , 1986). In the remainder of the paper dierent values of  will
be considered, but  will be kept xed at about 10 7m.
In the simplest version of GRW, GRW0, the wave function is all there is and its
evolution is determined by the Schrodinger equation (2.1) and the collapse process (2.2,
2.3, 2.5). In the limit where  is taken to zero, collapse never occurs and GRW0 becomes
Everettian quantum mechanics (a.k.a. the many-worlds interpretation or S0). All there
is is the wave function and it always evolves in accordance with the Schrodinger equation.
Defenders of Everettian quantum mechanics tend to view GRW0 as the right way to
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think about GRW theory since they think that our experiences of reality can emerge
from patterns in wave functions. For Everettians and others who prefer GRW0 to the
alternatives below, this paper can be read as a discussion of GRW0 in the strange regime
where it approaches Everettian quantum mechanics.
For some, GRW0 is unsatisfactory (e.g., Allori et al. , 2008, x4.3; Maudlin, 2010).
According to GRW0 there are no objects in familiar three-dimensional space, just a wave
function in an abstract space: a vector in Hilbert space, a complex-valued function on
conguration space, or some other exotic beast. In GRWm, the universe contains a wave
function which obeys the above dynamics, but that's not all there is, and, in some sense,
that's not the important stu. In particular, it's not the stu we're made o. In addition
to the wave function, there also exists a distribution of matter in three-dimensional space
specied by a density,
m(x; t) = h	(t)jcM(x) j	(t)i : (2.6)
Here cM(x) is the mass density operator dened by
cM(x) = NX
i=1
mi 
3(bxi   x) : (2.7)
In the limit as  goes to zero, there is no collapse and GRWm becomes Sm, Schrodinger
evolution with a mass density (discussed in Allori et al. , 2011). Sm is a many-worlds
theory much like Everettian quantum mechanics, but where the universe contains a
distribution of mass in three-dimensional space in addition to the unitarily evolving wave
function. Some think that GRW0 and S0 are unsatisfactory because such laws would
not give rise to creatures with conscious experiences like ours, perceiving an apparently
three-dimensional world. Readers who think GRW0 is unsatisfactory can understand
this paper as a discussion of GRWm in the awkward bit of parameter space where it
approaches Sm. In the following sections, I will not dierentiate between GRW0 and
GRWm. Read GRW in whichever way you think makes it the stronger theory. Read
MWI as S0 if you're reading GRW as GRW0, as Sm if you're reading GRW as GRWm.
There is a third version of GRW, GRWf. Here one supplements the wave function
with a primitive ontology of ashes. Taking  to be small in this version of the theory
raises entirely dierent concerns from those faced by GRW0 and GRWm. The problem
for GRWf when  is small is not that human lives are constantly ending, but that such
life may be absent altogether. Understanding the empirical adequacy of GRWf in this
region of parameter space would require a very dierent kind of analysis and for that
reason GRWf will not be discussed in the remainder of the article. A brief discussion of
GRWf in this regime can be found in Feldmann & Tumulka (2012, x4).
3 Branches and Stumps
GRW was originally formulated with the rate of collapse   10 16s 1. With this
rate, when a measurement occurs the wave function just starts to branch into a
superposition of outcomes when, with very high probability, the wave function collapses
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to a single denite outcome.1 This is how GRW solves the measurement problem: a
denite outcome is guaranteed by the rapid collapse of the wave function and the fact
that probabilities for collapsing to dierent outcomes are given by the Born rule is a
non-trivial2 consequence of the collapse process (2.2, 2.3, 2.5). If the rate of collapse
is taken to zero, then collapses never occur and GRW becomes MWI. In MWI, every
possible outcome of a quantum measurement actually occurs.
What if  is chosen so that it is not quite zero, but is very small (  10 16s 1,
keeping   10 7m3)? In this regime collapses occur, but only very rarely. When a
collapse occurs, the results are catastrophic. After a spin measurement, the laboratory
enters into a superposition of a world in which the scientists record an up result and
another in which they record down. Later, if any of the particles that compose the
scientists or the measurement readout collapse, one of the worlds will be destroyed.
Imagine 15 minutes pass between the moment when the measurement occurred and the
time when collapse chooses a world to eliminate.4 In this time, the scientists in both
worlds can walk, think, and talk. After collapse, only one world remains. When a
collapse like this occurs, all of the inhabitants of the other world are instantaneously
and painlessly killed. Or, maybe the collapse doesn't cause the other world to go out of
existence, but instead the tail of the Gaussian distorts the world and alters its evolution
so that it is inhospitable to human life.5 In this case, death is quick but perhaps not
instantaneous. Either way, in this region of parameter space collapses are not helpful
shifts which prevent macroscopic superpositions from forming, they're colossal natural
disasters.
The way the universe (a.k.a. multiverse) evolves in each of these three regions of
parameter space is depicted in gure 2. With  at or near zero, worlds branch every time
a measurement occurs and each outcome happens on some branch. For standard values
of , branching is prevented by the collapse of the wave function and each measurement
has a denite outcome. For small values of  branching occurs before collapse is able to
prevent it; collapse events occur after branching. Living in such a universe is extremely
dangerous as entire worlds are constantly being obliterated. If you are lucky enough to
nd yourself living a long life, you should be shocked. Repeated improbable occurrences
often indicate failure of a theory. This is no exception. The data you receive from your
survival provides strong empirical evidence against the theory.
1There has been some debate over whether the destruction of other branches is successful; see the
literature on the problem of tails. Here I assume that the problem can be solved. If it cannot, GRW is
not a viable solution to the measurement problem. In particular, I will assume that if collapse chooses
one part of the state and massively shrinks the rest, it is not merely improbable to nd oneself in a part
of the state that was not fortunate enough to be the center of the collapse, it is impossible. There is no
life in those other parts after collapse.
2For a recent version of the story, see Goldstein et al. (2012, x6.5).
3This ensures that, in general, a single collapse will be sucient to destroy branches in which the
measurement turned out dierently.
4This would be typical if we choose  to be on the order of 10 33s 1 and assume that there are
about 1030 fundamental particles brought into an entangled superposition by the experiment (using
(2.2)).
5See the brief discussion in Allori et al. (2011, x4).
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Figure 2: Plot of GRW evolution for a sequence of three measurements for dierent
values of .
4 The Rarity of Longevity
To judge the empirical adequacy of a given theory, I will focus on the likelihood of the
evidence given the theory, P (EjT ). If, for some evidence E and theories T1 and T2,
P (EjT1) > P (EjT2), then the evidence E conrms T1 over T2. If one updates on E by
Bayesian conditionalization, then for any theory T , the credence assigned to T after
gaining the evidence can be expressed in terms of the prior probabilities as Ppost(T ) =
P (T jE).6 It follows from the fact that P (EjT1) > P (EjT2) that, if one changes their
credences in response to E by Bayesian updating, the ratio of one's credence in T1 to
their credence in T2 will rise,
Ppost(T1)
Ppost(T2) =
P (EjT1)
P (EjT2)
P (T1)
P (T2) >
P (T1)
P (T2) (4.1)
Theories that are empirically equivalent will assign the evidence equal probability and
the data that comes in will not discern between them.
The theories to be compared are: versions of GRW with dierent parameter values,
6Although I expect that this straightforward account of theory conrmation applies to the cases
under discussion, one might reasonably be concerned. The situations considered involve self-locating
uncertainty (see Sebens & Carroll, 2014) and Bayesian conditionalization must be somehow modied to
handle such cases (see Arntzenius, 2003). Some modications will vindicate the use of conditionalization
here, others will not. To avoid controversy, I focus primarily on the probability of the evidence given
the theory and not the posterior probabilities that result from updating on the evidence.
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e.g., GRW=10 16s 1 ; the many-worlds interpretation, MWI; and some unspecied
theory which gives the correct Born rule probabilities and guarantees survival, QM.7
The constraint that QM gives the Born rule probabilities is the constraint that: the
probability of seeing the outcome corresponding to eigenvalue Oi of the observable
operator bO is given by
P (OijQM) = j hOij	i j2 : (4.2)
Throughout I'll assume that the agent knows whatever is useful to know about the
universal wave function, 	, including j hOij	i j2 for all i. This allows us to focus on the
conrmation of alternate dynamical theories without worrying about how agents learn
about the universe's wave function.
I will assume that MWI is capable of recovering the Born rule probabilities.8
Convenient Conjecture In MWI, after a measurement of the observable bO has been
made and before outcome is observed, the probability one ought to assign to seeing
the outcome corresponding to eigenvalue Oi is given by P (OijMWI) = j hOij	i j2.
This is a highly controversial assumption, so let me clarify the spirit in which I am
introducing it. In order to put empirical lower bounds on  we need to consider cases
where GRW becomes more and more like MWI. If we don't have quantitative predictions
from MWI, it will not be possible to quantify the success of GRW in these bits of
parameter space. Later I'll discuss how things change when the conjecture is removed
(x5).
In the notation used here, GRW=0 is MWI. So, when a measurement is made,
P (OijMWI) = P (OijGRW=0). Thus if we are assuming that the Convenient
Conjecture is true and thereby that MWI is empirically adequate, it follows that
GRW=0 is empirically adequate as well.
The question, then, is for what values of  is GRW approximately empirically
equivalent to QM and when do the predictions of GRW and QM diverge? If the
predictions diverge signicantly, GRW becomes empirically inadequate|the data we
actually have ts the predictions of QM. Let's assume for the remainder of this section
that the rate of collapse  is suciently small that whenever a measurement occurs we
can expect there to be copies of the experimenter who record each outcome. From the
Convenient Conjecture and the fact that the dynamics are the same in GRW and
MWI before collapse, it is reasonable to suppose that for these small values of  the
probability of seeing each result is given by
P (OijGRW) = j hOij	i j2 : (4.3)
But, the observed experimental outcome is not the only data one has to update on.
The experimenter should also take into account the fact that she has survived for a
7What wonderful theory succeeds in recovering the Born rule, as is demanded of the theory I've called
\QM"? This will be a matter of disagreement. Let QM stand in for your favorite theory, whichever you
think recovers the right probabilities, be it MWI, GRW=10 16s 1 , Bohmian mechanics, or something
else.
8For an extended defense of this conjecture, see Wallace (2012). See also Carroll & Sebens (2014);
Sebens & Carroll (2014).
7
time t beyond the moment when the measurement was performed. The probability
for surviving to t can be calculated as
P (tjGRW&Oi) = 1  P (fatal collapse by tjGRW&Oi)
= 1  P (deathjcollapse by t&GRW&Oi) P (collapse by tjGRW&Oi) :
(4.4)
The probability of a collapse occurring by t can be approximated using (2.2) along
with the simplifying assumption that there are NS particles whose collapse would cause
a jump to a single outcome: P (collapse by tjGRW&Oi) = 1   e NSt.9 The
probability of dying in the event of such a collapse is just the probability that the collapse
is centered around some branch other than one's own: 1  j hOij	i j2.10 Inserting these
two expressions into (4.4) yields
P (tjGRW&Oi) = j hOij	i j2 + e NSt   j hOij	i j2e NSt : (4.5)
The probability of the total evidence can be assessed by combining (4.3) and (4.5),
P (Oi&tjGRW) = P (tjGRW&Oi) P (OijGRW)
=

j hOij	i j2 + e NSt   j hOij	i j2e NSt

j hOij	i j2 : (4.6)
We can better understand this formula by considering a simple case. Imagine  
10 33s 1 and NS  1030 so that the experimenter can expect to have approximately 15
minutes between measurement and collapse (as in footnote 4). In this time, she can form
expectations about what will happen and look around. Suppose she sees an outcome,
OA, with low Born rule probability, j hOAj	i j2 = 110 . She should be somewhat surprised
and also afraid. Now she knows that she only has a one in ten chance of survival. If she
makes it through the day, she should be surprised again. The probability assigned to
the total evidence (surviving and seeing that outcome) is 110  110 = 1100 , which follows
from (4.6) with t 1NS .11
If  is so small that no collapses are expected to occur within any reasonable
length of time t and the Convenient Conjecture holds, the predictions of GRW
approximately match those of QM. However, as has been noted (Feldmann & Tumulka,
2012, x4), there would be little motivation for such a theory. It would be simpler to
9More realistically, NS would increase as a function of time.
10This is an optimistic estimate. In fact there will usually be many worlds corresponding to each
outcome and thus even when a collapse is centered on the right outcome Oi, one's world might be
destroyed.
11What if instead she learns that she's survived before she observes the outcome? Assume for
simplicity that there are just two possible outcomes, OA and OB . In this case her survival should
not be much of a surprise, the probability is 82%. The probability of OA is 10% and the chance of
survival given OA is 10%. The probability of the other outcome, OB , is 90% and the chance of survival
given OB is 90%. Thus the total chance of survival is
1
10
 1
10
+ 9
10
 9
10
= 82
100
. The probability she
should assign to OA given that she survived can be calculated by Bayes' theorem as the probability of
survival conditional on OA,
1
10
, times the probability of OA,
1
10
, divided by the probability of survival,
82
100
. This yields 1
82
. The probability assigned to her total evidence is the probability of surviving times
the probability of seeing OA upon surviving,
82
100
 1
82
= 1
100
.
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just set  to zero and remove the collapses all together, yielding MWI. As  grows it
becomes more likely that a collapse will have occurred within t and the disagreement
between GRW and QM gets worse. QM predicts that you will be alive whereas GRW
assigns a certain probability to your death. For xed , the larger t is the larger the
disagreement between QM and GRW. However, once  is suciently large the crucial
assumption that branching precedes collapse becomes invalid. In the next section I'll
consider cases in which branching is prevented by collapse.
The fact that one's own continued survival is used as evidence for assessing theories
is undeniably odd. Experimenters don't typically keep track of the time elapsed since
the experiment was performed. But, epistemologists have contemplated cases much like
this where survival is relevant data. Consider the following much-discussed example
(Leslie, 1989; Swinburne, 1990):
Firing Squad Suppose that a dozen well-trained shooters are ordered to execute you
by ring 12 shots each. While blindfolded you hear 144 shots ring out but you
survive unscathed.
In such a scenario, your own survival provides evidence that the shooters intentionally
let you live over the alternative hypothesis that you got lucky because each of the 144
shots missed its intended target.
The situation here is similar to Firing Squad. The hypothesis that the squad
intentionally misses is like the hypothesis that QM is true and there are no cataclysmic
collapse events. The hypothesis that the shooters were attempting to kill you is like the
hypothesis that GRW is true for some troublesome small-but-not-too-small choice of 
where worlds are constantly snued out quickly and without warning. However, there
is an important dierence: In Firing Squad, the target will either survive or be killed.
In GRW with troublesome , there will be many versions of the experimenter that are
killed and always at least one that survives. A closer non-quantum analogy is:
Prison Poisoning On New Year's Day you wake up in a nondescript prison cell, #27.
A coin was ipped. On New Year's Eve, you were blindfolded and shipped either
to Alcatraz, if heads, or Arkham, if tails. Each prison contains 100 numbered cells
and you were randomly assigned to #27.12 While you slept in your cell the ball
dropped and the new year began with a randomly chosen 99 of the 100 cells in
Arkham being lled with deadly poison gas. Those in Alcatraz were safe. You
knew the plan all along.
In this case, you should initially think it equally likely that you ended up in either prison.
After surviving the night you should come to believe that you were probably shipped
to Alcatraz since being shipped to Arkham would have likely resulted in your death.
It was guaranteed that one of the prisoners in Arkham would survive, but it was not
likely to be the one in cell #27. Alcatraz is like MWI and Arkham is like GRW with
troublesome .13 The cells represent 100 possible results of a measurement and the gas
12For the closest analogy, imagine that each cell of the prison is occupied by a copy of you that
resulted from a 1-to-100 ssion midday on New Year's Eve.
13For an analogue of GRW with a normal collapse rate, consider a prison with a single cell, randomly
numbered and free of poison. In this case, the ssion in footnote 12 should not be supposed.
9
plays the role of collapse.14
Those who are attracted to the idea of quantum immortality may object to the
conclusions reached in this section. Consider a dangerous branching event from the
perspective of the many-worlds interpretation (a \quantum suicide" scenario). Suppose
you survive on one branch and die immediately, or quickly, on all others. It is tempting to
think you should expect survival with certainty. As Lewis (2004) put it, \The experience
of being dead should never be expected to any degree at all, because there is no such
experience." If death is indeed immediate on all branches but one, the thought has some
plausibility. But if there is any delay, it should be rejected. In such a case, there is a
short period of time when there are multiple copies of you, each (eectively) causally
isolated from the others and able to assign a credence to being the one who will live.
Only one will survive. Surely rationality does not compel you to be maximally optimistic
in such a scenario.15 The situation in GRW with a troublesome collapse rate is just like
the delayed-death version of the above quantum suicide scenario and, as in that case,
survival should not receive probability one. If the collapse rate is raised so that the
agent never splits into multiple copies, there is no danger of death and survival can be
expected with certainty.
5 Averting Branching
If collapse occurs suciently soon after a measurement, branching can be averted. As
the other branches of the universe where the outcome was dierent are just beginning to
form, the collapse event occurs, ensuring that the macroscopic readout gives a denite
result and the experimenter sees a single outcome. The simplest way to implement this
feature of the theory is by imposing a cuto characterizing the amount of time that
passes before branching occurs if there is no collapse. If a collapse happens within  ,
branching is averted and a single outcome occurs. If collapse does not occur until after
 , then there is a branching of worlds before the collapse, as in the previous section. Let
C< indicate that collapse occurs before the cuto, C> indicate after. Including both
of these possibilities, the probability of the data given the theory can be expressed as
P (Oi&tjGRW) =
¬z }| {
P (Oi&tjGRW&C> )
­z }| {
P (C> jGRW)
+ P (Oi&tjGRW&C< )| {z }
®
P (C< jGRW)| {z }
¯
: (5.1)
The rst piece, ¬, is just as in (4.6) where it was assumed that branching preceded
collapse. The fourth piece, ¯, is the probability that a collapse happens by  . This
14Cases like Prison Poisoning and Firing Squad have a curious feature: one hypothesis cannot
be conrmed by the subject in the scenario. If the poison acts instantly, no course of experience
would support the Arkham hypothesis over Alcatraz. Similarly, if collapse kills instantly there are no
experiences one could have that would provide evidence for GRW with troublesome  over QM (if the
Convenient Conjecture holds).
15The situation here is like that of the prisoner in Arkham if the period between the splitting event
(see footnote 12) and the deaths were made much shorter.
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follows directly from (2.2), ¯ = 1  e NS . The second piece is simply the probability
that a collapse does not occur, ­ = 1 ¯. The third piece, ®, is the probability that a
given outcome resulted from the GRW collapse process in a case where branching does
not occur. Here we have GRW working as intended and the probability should be in
approximate agreement with the Born rule provided  is not so large as to push us into
the empirically refuted region of parameter space (gure 1), ®  j hOij	i j2. Inserting
these expressions in (5.1) and rearranging gives,
P (Oi&tjGRW) = j hOij	i j2  

1  j hOij	i j2

1  e NSt

j hOij	i j2e NS ;
(5.2)
which limits to the Born rule probabilities as  goes to zero or innity.16 (5.2) is not
valid if  is large enough that the probabilities in ® deviate signicantly from those
given by the Born rule. It cannot be extended in a simple and general manner as the
way in which ® deviates from j hOij	i j2 will be depend on the particular experiment
under consideration.
To recap: If  is so extremely small that you should not expect (relevant) collapses
to have occurred in your lifetime (gure 2.a), then GRW is empirically adequate if the
Convenient Conjecture holds. If  is large enough that collapses must be considered
but small enough that branching typically precedes collapse (gure 2.c), then early death
is the norm and one's continued survival provides strong evidence against the theory. If
 is increased to around the initially proposed value of 10 16s 1 (gure 2.b), the theory
may again be empirically adequate as branching is prevented by collapse and the collapse
process ensures that the probabilities of various outcomes are given by the Born rule. If 
is increased even further, so that  > 10 8, the theory is again empirically inadequate as
collapses occur too frequently. Superpositions are destroyed mid-experiment and other
maladies ensue (see Feldmann & Tumulka, 2012; Bassi et al. , 2013).
What happens if the Convenient Conjecture is false and MWI gives dierent
probabilities from QM? Then, GRW=0 is empirically inadequate as GRW=0 is MWI.
This failure also rules out GRW for very small  where collapses can be neglected.
For larger values of  where collapse is rare but non-negligible, there are now two ways
in which the theory fails: the probabilities of the various outcomes are incorrect and
there is, in general, some probability that one would not have survived to t. For still
larger values of  that successfully avert branching, the theory again has a chance of
being empirically adequate since the probabilities of outcomes are now determined by
the collapse process and the MWI probabilities are irrelevant.
16In this simplied story, the probability of surviving to t and seeing a certain outcome Oi
depends dramatically and discontinuously on whether collapse happens before or after branching. The
expressions for ¬ and ® are quite dierent. A more careful analysis would ideally give a smooth
transition, but this would require wading into the murky territory of collapses that occur during
branching (as branching is gradual not instantaneous) and settling questions of personal identity there
(in particular, when exactly personal ssion occurs and whether it can, in any relevant sense, partially
occur). It might be seen either as intriguing or disconcerting that we must answer questions of personal
identity to put precise lower bounds on .
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6 The Race: Decoherence vs. Collapse
For GRW to be tenable, there must be values of  for which the theory is empirically
adequate. On the one hand, must be large enough that collapse practically never occurs
after the experimenter has branched into multiple copies. Otherwise, one's continued
survival empirically refutes GRW, (5.2). On the other hand,  must be small enough
that collapses do not spoil the results of experiments that have been performed. That
is,  must lie below the experimentally refuted region of gure 1. But, are there any
values in this range? To answer this, we need to determine whether decoherence-induced
branching tends to occur before or after collapse.
We know that for values of  near the originally suggested value, 10 16s 1, the
experiment readout and the experimenter are in a well-dened state corresponding to
a single outcome very soon after the measurement occurs. But, what is not clear is
which of two possibilities occurred immediately after the measurement (gure 3): (a)
the world briey branched and then a collapse event destroyed some of the copies of the
experimenter, or (b) there was never a branching event because collapse prevented the
microscopic superposition from causing the experimenter to enter into a superposition.
Figure 3: Two potential close-ups of gure 2.b.
A proper analysis is warranted, but beyond the scope of this paper. Here is
a very rough calculation of how quickly collapse would have to occur to prevent
decoherence-induced branching: Decoherence is fast. A slow estimate might be 10 23s
for 1 gram of matter at room temperature in a superposition of two locations separated
by one centimeter (Zurek, 2003). To ensure a 95% probability of collapse by 10 23s, 
would have to be at least 3 s 1 (from (2.2), assuming the number of particles is on the
scale of moles, N = 1023). But, experiments restrict  to being at most 10 8s 1 (gure
1). This calculation suggests trouble. There may not be a safe region of parameter
space.
Let me highlight two of the most pernicious simplications in this rough calculation:
First, it is assumed that the bit of matter starts in a superposition. In actuality, it
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would take time for the matter to enter a superposition and a collapse event could occur
in this interval, preventing the macroscopic superposition from forming. Second, when
decoherence occurs in this scenario one may doubt whether there is a branching of worlds
and in particular whether the experimenter branches. In GRW0, it's tempting to say
there that the experimenter has branched as there are now two well-separated parts
of the wave function that will never again interact (non-negligibly), even if no future
collapses occur. In GRWm, it is easier to resist this conclusion as the mass-density of
the experimenter may be unaected by the decoherence of this macroscopic object.
I'll close by summarizing the key lessons of the analysis. First, to determine precise
experimental bounds on the parameters  and  in GRW, we must determine the
probabilities assigned to dierent outcomes in MWI (x4). This provides additional
motivation for that ongoing research program. Second, even if the Convenient
Conjecture holds and MWI is empirically adequate, some of the philosophically
unsatisfactory region of parameter space is also empirically refuted (x3, 4, & 5).
Surprisingly, it is not refuted by the outcomes we observe, but by the fact that we
live long enough to observe so many of them. Third, it is not clear how to draw a
principled border for the philosophically unsatisfactory region if our dissatisfaction is
purely \philosophical" (x1). But, with the realization that small values of the collapse
rate  are empirically refuted, we now have a method to begin drawing principled lower
bounds on : determine whether the experimenter branches before or after collapse
(x5 & 6). Simple calculations suggest that the lower bound generated from empirical
considerations will be stronger than the bound generated from a distaste for long lasting
macroscopic superpositions, perhaps strong enough to rule out GRW entirely (x6). This
merits further study.
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